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The intergenerational transmission of employers between fathers and sons is a common 
feature of labour markets in Canada and Denmark, with 30 to 40% of young adults having at 
some point been employed with a firm that also employed their fathers. This is strongly 
associated with the first jobs obtained during the teen years, but for four to about six percent 
it also refers to the main job in adulthood. In both countries the transmission of employers is 
positively associated with paternal earnings, rising distinctly and sharply at the very top of the 
father’s earnings distribution, and has implications for the intergenerational transmission of 
earnings. Mobility out of the bottom has little to do with inheriting an employer from the father, 
while the preservation of high income status is distinctly related to this tendency. These 
findings stress that child adult outcomes are related to the structure of labour markets, and 
underscore the role of resources parents have – though information, networks, or direct 
control of the hiring process – in facilitating the job search of their children. 
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The Intergenerational Transmission 




1. Introduction and motivation 
 
Children must advance through a whole series of transitions at different points in their lives, 
which to varying degrees may all have a bearing on their ultimate labour market success as 
adults. This paper addresses the relationship between parental income and the labour market 
outcomes of teenagers and young adults. This gradient refers to the relationship between family 
circumstances during adolescence and early adult outcomes. This is an important transition in a 
child’s life because it relates directly to some of the issues addressed by Roemer (2004) in his 
concern over the relationship between measures of generational mobility, equality of opportunity, 
and the appropriate role for public policy.  
To perhaps overly simplify his argument, a strong gradient in incomes across the 
generations could reflect genetic and other hereditary endowments associated with the early 
years. The transmission of family values, preferences, and other inherent characteristics like 
motivation, may permit parents who are relatively well advantaged to raise children who in turn 
go on to be relatively advantaged adults. If these characteristics are valued by labour markets over 
time, there will also be a correlation in the earnings of the two generations. Different societies 
will draw the line between family and the state in different ways, so the correlation in incomes 
across the generations would not necessarily be viewed as indicating inequality of opportunities. 
In other words, if hereditary endowments associated with the very nature of families and how 
they raise their children are driving the correlation in adult outcomes, then the case for public 
policy intervention—assuming it is effective—would involve a cost in terms of liberty and 
autonomy that may or may not be acceptable. 2 
 
  At the other extreme a strong correlation in parent-child incomes could also reflect other 
investments later in life, particularly the role of networks or direct control in the hiring process 
that influence the opportunities for employment in the labour market. The children of relatively 
well-advantage parents could benefit by getting jobs—either temporary jobs that facilitate the 
transition from schooling to work, or career jobs that determine their permanent income—by 
relying upon the contacts and information their parents may share with them, or for that matter 
through the direct or indirect control parents may have in the hiring process of their employers. 
This perspective puts the emphasis on how social and labour market institutions function and 
interact with family background to determine adult outcomes. For example, Roemer points out 
that if nepotism is the source of the cross-generational income-income gradient many citizens of 
the OECD countries may not see this as reflecting equal opportunities, and there may be a 
stronger consensus on the role for government intervention. 
  The objective of this paper is to inform a discussion of this sort. More specifically we 
document the extent of the intergenerational transmission of employers, and in a descriptive way 
relate it to the transmission of earnings in two relatively mobile countries: Canada and Denmark. 
To be precise, we study the degree to which sons—both during their teen years as they are 
making the transition from full-time schooling to full-time employment, and during their young 
adult years once they have established themselves in what will arguably be their career jobs—
work for the same employer as their fathers. Our choice of these two countries is certainly driven 
by the availability of data with sufficient and appropriate detail, but is also important in a 
substantive sense because it is generally accepted that they are among the most mobile countries 
when comparisons are made of earnings inter-generationally. The elasticity of father-son earnings 
is about 0.2 or even less in both countries, compared to 0.4 to 0.6 in countries such as the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and France (Corak 2006). Yet at the same time, they are very 
different in the structure of their labour markets: Denmark being a geographically much smaller 
and less diverse country. However, it has high equality of earnings and incomes and a high degree 3 
 
of intergenerational mobility. This said, despite high unionization rates, the degree of employee 
turnover and general flexibility suggests that the Danish labour market has more in common with 
North America than with continental Europe. Furthermore, Denmark belongs to the group of 
countries with the lowest returns to schooling (Harmon et al 2001). Canada is less equal in cross-
sectional outcomes, less unionized, and has a higher return to human capital. As such we feel that 
this comparison may have broader relevance, and suggest avenues for future research among a 
wider set of countries. If the intergenerational transmission of employers is significant in these 
countries, and if it is strongly related to generational earnings mobility, then even relatively low 
correlations in intergenerational earnings may be cause for concern, and by implication raises the 
need for closer examination of the underlying reasons for higher correlations in other countries. 
Our major finding is that the intergenerational transmission of employers is both very 
significant and very similar across these two countries. It is a common aspect of how families and 
labour markets interact, with about 30 to 40% of the young men we study having at some point 
been employed with a firm that also employed their fathers. This reflects the first jobs these 
individuals obtain during their teen years. As such our analysis notes that parents continue to 
invest and influence outcomes for their children well into the teenage and young adult years. In 
addition we find that about four to about six percent of the cohorts we study have their main job 
in adulthood at an employer who provided their fathers with a main job some 15 years earlier. 
Second, we also find that these patterns are positively associated with paternal earnings and to 
remarkably similar degree across the two countries, rising distinctly and sharply at the very top of 
the earnings distribution. Finally, we document the fact that these patterns have implications for 
the intergenerational transmission of earnings. Upward mobility of teenagers raised in low 
income has little to do with inheriting an employer from the father, but the preservation of high 
income status is strongly related to this tendency. The results from a series of quantile regressions 
suggest that the inheritance of employers cuts against this the notion of equality of opportunity in 
the sense that Roemer has used that term. 4 
 
2. Some definitions and the nature of the data 
 
Our analysis focuses on parental investments at the latter point in the child’s teen years, in 
particular  the teen years associated with secondary schooling (15 to 18 years of age) and the 
early adult years associated with the transition to the labor market or to higher education (19 to 22 
years of age). For our purposes adult outcomes are measured at about the age of 30 or a little 
later. 
These definitions reflect in part the characteristics of our administrative data, but also the 
particular type of parental investment upon which we focus. During the teen years children are 
beginning to interact with the labor market, finding their first jobs and developing a work ethic, 
yet many are still completing their education. During their early 20s some have made a permanent 
transition to the labour market, others are continuing their education, but in most cases 
occupational choices are beginning to crystallize.  
There is a sense that our data may be unique, but our hope is that their development will 
spur similar research in other countries. They permit us to examine the extent to which children 
are employed at the same firm as their fathers, and the consequences this has for long run labour 
market outcomes in adulthood. An observation of employment in the same firm as the father is 
taken as an indicator that parents have a network upon which children can rely in their job search, 
that they are employed with firms that have hiring rules favoring the children of employees, or 
that they themselves have some control over the hiring process. These are all resources that can 
be of benefit to the child in making the transition to the labor market, and that may also have long 
run implications by translating any given level of education into employment with a particular 
firm. 
Our analysis relies on information that in principle represents the entire population of 
particular cohorts of young men in both countries. For Canada we base the analysis on about 
70,000 individuals who come close to representing the population of a cohort of men born in 
1963. These individuals are followed to the age of 33. These administrative data—which are 5 
 
based on income tax returns—are linked to their fathers and mothers. Just as importantly the data 
also contain identifiers on up to four firms per year for the fathers and sons from the time the 
child was 15 years of age to 33. Corak and Piraino (2011, 2010) use the same data, and some of 
the Canadian information reported here is drawn from Corak and Piraino (2011). 
These data are based upon on individual income tax returns that have been grouped into 
families. Our sample is drawn from 1.9 million men who are linked to their fathers—not 
necessarily their biological fathers—if they filed an income tax return between 1982 and 1986 
while still living at home. From this data we select the cohort born in 1963, the oldest cohort of 
sons available to us. To remain in the analytical sample the father must have positive earnings in 
each of the five years the son was 15 to 19 years old. Sons must have positive earnings in each of 
three years, 1994 to 1996. If either the father or the son reports no earnings over these time 
horizons the pair is not included in the analysis. This would imply, for example, those who are 
self-employed, and never report any earnings over the five and three year horizons, are not part of 
the analysis. As mentioned the sample size is about 71,000 observations, representing 84,000 
individuals when appropriately weighted.
1 Fathers are on average 47 years old when their 
earnings are calculated.  
For Denmark the data are more extensive. They come from the administrative sources in 
existence since 1980, and contain information on all individuals and employers and the length of 
time they are matched. We construct the data to permit a focus on the same age cohort as the 
Canadian, but information on younger and older cohorts up to their early 40s is also available. 
The sample size is just under 195,000.  
The Danish register data cover the entire population of about five million people, but our 
analysis takes 515,986 sons from the 1965 to 1976 birth cohorts as its starting point. The link 
                                                 
1 These restrictions are imposed in order to minimize the role of measurement error in earnings, as stressed 
in the literature on intergenerational earnings mobility (Solon 1992, 1989). We also require that the 
earnings of both sons and fathers must be above the bottom percentile thereby avoiding some suspected 
measurement errors in the data. 
 6 
 
between fathers and sons requires that they live at the same address together at one point of time 
after 1965. On this basis we identify 402,027 father-son pairs. Of these 274,296 have an 
identifiable main employer, and there are 198,718 cases with the father reporting positive 
earnings in each of the five years when the son was 15 to 19 years old. We use the earnings of 
sons when they are 30 years old. Danes finish higher education relatively late, so for many 30 
years of age is the beginning of their full-time careers. 
In both countries the analysis refers to employment in the private sector only. The only 
exception to this is the inclusion of municipal governments in the Canadian case. Otherwise the 
observation that both father and son work for the government—in Canada either the federal or 
one of the provincial governments—is not coded as a match. This is because the employer 
identifier for the government captures all possible jobs in all possible regions, many of which will 
have nothing to do with direct parental influence. This said the findings should be interpreted as 
an understatement of the true extent to which employers are transmitted cross-generationally. 
Between 6 and 8% of sons work in the public sector at ages 18 and older. In Denmark, the nature 
of municipal, region and State identification would include way too many ―false‖ matches due to 
the extensive public sector paired with large administrative units. Finally, in both countries an 
employer should be understood to mean an ―enterprise‖, rather than a particular plant. 
Our analysis is based upon two complementary definitions of same firm employment 
across the generations. The first is a broad definition meant to reflect the network of employers of 
which the father has direct knowledge by virtue of having worked with them. We define a binary 
indicator of same firm employment that takes a value of 1 when the son at any particular age from 
16 to 30 in Denmark, and up to 33 in Canada, was in that year, or in any previous year, employed 
with any employer that also employed his father in any previous year back to the year the son was 
15 years old. This is a time-varying indicator, and we use its value when the son is in his early 
30s as the basis for our analysis. We refer to this value as ―ever same firm.‖ 7 
 
Figure 1 offers the pattern in this indicator for sons in both countries from the age of 16. 
On the basis of this indicator the proportion of same firm employment can only increase with 
time. At the age of 16 11% of the Danish sons in our sample are working with an employer who 
had employed their fathers in the previous year; 8% of Canadian sons are in a similar situation. 
These proportions rise sharply in both countries during the teen years, reaching respectively 22% 
and 29% at age 20. The intergenerational transmission of employers is, in other words, an 
important aspect of finding the first jobs teenagers hold. After the age of about 23 to 24 the 
proportion of sons who have ever been employed with a previous employer of their fathers begins 
to level and does not increase very much at all after about the age of 26. By their late twenties or 
early thirties 28% of Danes and 40% of Canadians have at some point worked with an employer 
for which their fathers had also worked.
3 
The second indicator we derive is intended to reflect the permanent earnings of the son, 
and is based upon the main employer at age 30 or so. This is the employer accounting for the 
majority of the son’s earnings over a three year period. This in turn is related to the employer 
accounting for the majority of the father’s earnings over the five year period when the son was 15 
to 19 years old. We refer to this as ―same main employer,‖ and our intention is to relate this 
measure to the degree of intergenerational transmission of earnings. It is for this reason that we 
define the indicator over a period of successive years, reflecting the averaging in earnings we also 
undertake to reduce the role of transitory fluctuations and come closer to a measure of permanent 
income. In Denmark we find that 4.0% of sons work for the same main employer as their fathers, 
while in Canada 5.6% of sons are in the same situation. 
                                                 
3 It should be noted that part of the pattern of change in the early years of the part of the life-course we 
examine could be due to a mechanical effect reflecting the fact that we only begin to examine the father’s 
employers when the son was fifteen years of age. As the son ages the incidence of same firm employment 
will rise because more years of information becomes available on the father’s employment history. This 
said, this effect would appear to have worked itself out by the end of the period we examine, which is our 
main analytical concern.  
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The slightly higher incidence of same firm employment in Denmark at the youngest ages 
could reflect the structure of apprenticeship programs, which facilitate the school to work 
transition in a more formal way than in Canada. On the other hand, the higher overall proportions 
of same firm and same main firm employment in Canada may reflect the much larger geographic 
dispersion of employment combined with less mobility between regions. For example, if the labor 
market is segmented with high costs of mobility between potential employers, then it is more 
likely that simply by random chance sons will be employed with the same firms because of the 
limited job opportunities available in their region of residence. Corak and Piraino (2011) examine 
various aspects of this possibility and note through a series of counterfactual simulations that at 
the very most this accounts for one to 1.5 percentage points of the 5.6% incidence of same firm 
employment. This result is based upon a simulation in which the son’s job mobility is restricted to 
the same industry and same finely defined region as the father.  This leaves a significant fraction 
of the overall incidence open to family influences, but combined with a lower average firm size in 




3. The intergenerational transmission of employers and paternal earnings 
 
The major objective of our analytical work is to document the gradient between parental earnings 
and the degree to which sons inherit their father’s employer. Figures 2 and 3 present the incidence 
of same firm employment, for each of our two indicators, according to the percentile of the 
father’s earnings distribution. The patterns are clearly similar across the two countries. 
  Figure 2 shows that the incidence of sons ever having worked for an employer that also 
employed the father follows a U-shaped pattern. Generally the incidence is lowest in the middle 
part of the father’s earnings distribution, and higher in the bottom and top 20%. The other notable 
pattern is the sharp spike in the incidence at the very top of the earnings distribution in both 
countries. In Denmark the incidence of same firm employment rises distinctly above the 90
th 9 
 
percentile, where it is always above 30%. But above the 95
th percentile it is well above this 
proportion increasing to 35% and just surpassing 50% at the top percentile. In Canada the pattern 
is similar, with about 45% of sons having had the same employer as their father when the father is 
in the 90
th to 95
th percentile of his earnings distribution, and rising to above 50% for higher 
earning fathers before almost reaching 70% in the case of top percentile fathers. 
  Figure 3 offers similar information for the incidence of the transmission of same main 
employers. In Denmark the pattern is roughly constant throughout the paternal earnings 
distribution, increasing perhaps from generally below 4% to about that level. In Canada there is a 
clear linear increase, rising steadily from about four to five percent in the lower fifth of the 
father’s earnings distribution, to six to eight percent in the upper third or so. But again in both 
countries there is a noticeable increase in the chances at the very top, with fully 10 to 15% of the 
sons of top percentile fathers employed as young adults at the same main employer that employed 
their fathers some 10 to 15 years earlier. 
  These bivariate relationships between paternal earnings and the chances sons will have 
the same employer as the fathers are robust to a host of controls. We estimate a series of linear 
probability models of the incidence of same firm employment for both definitions that include a 
number of control variables that are common to the two countries. They include characteristics of 
the father such as age, indicators for the source of income, and number of employers, and 
characteristics of the firm, industry, and controls for the diversity of employment opportunities in 
the local labor market: whether the firm was still in existence during the son’s adulthood, firm 
size, the industry employment growth rate, two-digit SIC industry indicators, and relatively fine 
indicators of location, including measures of whether the son resided in an urban area or not. 
  Our main interest is in the results for two variables: the natural logarithm of the father’s 
earnings (and its square), and an indicator for the presence of self-employment income. The 
former documents the gradient between income and the transmission of employers net of some 
basic controls associated mostly with industrial structure that may determine the chances sons 10 
 
will be employed with their father’s firm. For example, as suggested, if the local labor market is 
not very diverse and if there is little inter-regional mobility it is likely that sons will be employed 
with the same employer as their fathers by virtue of the fact that job opportunities are not 
available with many other firms. Similarly, sons are more or less likely to be employed in the 
same firm as their fathers if that firm is experiencing significant increases or decreases in 
employment by virtue of being in a growing or declining industry, or if firms tend to large in size 
relative to the labor force. It is also sometimes noted that unionized firms may have implicit or 
explicit hiring rules that favor the children of employees (Shea 2000). 
  This said, we also highlight the role of self-employment income as its presence may 
indicate that the father could have direct control over the hiring process by virtue of firm 
ownership. We should note that the variable used is an indicator of the presence or not of self-
employment income among the fathers total income, and need not strictly have its origin in the 
same firm from which he obtained his earnings. We can only identify the employer that was the 
source of the earnings, and it is this employer that is used in deriving the incidence of the 
generational transmission of employers. To the extent that self-employed fathers also pay 
themselves earnings, the employer will be the same.  
  Table 1 presents a summary of the complete least squares regression results focused these 
selected variables. In both countries there is a clear quadratic relationship between paternal 
earnings and same firm employment for both definitions. The values of the coefficients suggest 
that the relationship is parabolic, always increasing and increasing at a greater rate with higher 
and higher levels of father’s earnings. As such the general patterns displayed in Figures 1 and 2 
seem, for the most part, to hold up in a multi-variate context. Further, the relationship between the 
chances of being employed at the same employer as one’s father are positively and strongly 
related to whether or not the father reported having some self-employment income. In the case of 
Denmark the presence of self-employment income implies that the probability of same-firm 
employment is higher by 33.2 and 3.7 percentage points for respectively ever same employer and 11 
 
same main employer. We ascribe these rather large estimates to the incentives associated with tax 
filing where self-employed can exploit the tax-free allowance for their sons by having them on 
the payroll. In Canada the similar figures are five percentage points for ever same employer, off 
of an overall average of about 40%, and 0.5 percentage points for same-main-employer, 
compared to an average of just less than 6%. As such, net of the influence of total paternal 
earnings, the presence of self-employment seems more strongly associated with the chances of 
ever getting a job with an employer the father had than with the chances of getting a career job 
with the same career employer as the father. 
   
4. The intergenerational transmission of employers and adult earnings 
 
The finding that there is a clear positive relationship between paternal earnings and the chances of 
same firm employment raises the issue of how relevant the transmission of employers is to the 
intergenerational transmission of earnings. In order to document this relationship we focus on the 
transmission of main employers, as these are most closely related to the adult earnings that form 
the basis for intergenerational earnings studies. Using Canadian data Corak and Piraino (2011) 
report that the presence of same main employers across the generations does not appreciably 
change the overall average elasticity between father and son earnings in large measure because 
there are only about six percent of sons with same main employers as their fathers. But their 
findings, and the results we document above, suggest that this influence could well vary across 
the parental earnings distribution; the possibility of non-linearities in the intergenerational 
elasticity being assumed away in the linear specification common in this literature. Accordingly 
in the descriptive analysis that follows we pay particular attention to differences across the 
paternal and child distributions, and begin by focusing on certain parts of the transition matrices. 
But we also note that transition matrices and estimates of the average intergenerational earnings 
elasticity do not directly inform a discussion about equality of opportunity for the reasons 12 
 
highlighted by Roemer (2004), and we therefore then frame the analysis in a way a more 
appropriate way to address this issue.  
  Panel A of Figure 4 presents slices of the full quartile transition matrix between father 
and son earnings for both countries.
4 The earnings quartiles of sons raised by bottom quartile 
fathers are presented in the left panel of the figure, while that for sons raised by top quartile 
fathers are offered in the right panel. These rows of the transition matrix are very similar between 
the two countries. In Canada about 35% of sons born to bottom quartile fathers become bottom 
quartile adults; in Denmark about 30% do so. The extent of upward mobility for these young men 
is even more similar: 37% of Canadians rise to the top half of the distribution as do 39% of 
Danes, with 16% in both countries managing the largest move to the top quartile. The similarities 
are also present at the upper end of the paternal earnings distribution. In both countries there is 
more stickiness at the top of the distribution than at the bottom, with almost 40% of sons raised 
by top quartile fathers also attaining the top quartile of the earnings distribution in the next 
generation. In both countries 37 to 38% of these sons fall to the bottom half of the earnings 
distribution, with 17% of Canadians falling fall to the bottom compared to 21% of Danes. 
  Panel B shows how these patterns are related to the intergenerational transmission of 
main employers, with again the left panel indicating the situation of sons born to bottom quartile 
fathers and the right indicating that of those originating in the top quartile. In both countries the 
incidence of same main employer is about 3 to 4 percent for the children of the relatively poor 
fathers regardless of whether they remain poor or whether they move to the very top of their 
earnings distribution (though at 2.3% a bit lower for Danes who manage to reach the top quartile). 
This is in sharp contrast with the experience of sons born to rich fathers. There is a clear gradient 
in the proportion having the same main employer as the father according to the relative earnings 
outcome of the son. Sons of top quartile fathers who fall to the bottom quartile are not very likely 
to have the same main employer as the father: only 2 to 3% do so, a proportion that is even less 
                                                 
4 The complete quartile transition matrices are appended as Appendix Table 1. 13 
 
than bottom quartile sons. In sharp contrast, this incidence is much higher if these sons remain in 
the top half of the earnings distribution, and particularly if they remain in the same quartile as 
their fathers. In Canada almost 12 percent (or twice the overall average) of sons who are in the 
top quartile obtain their relatively high earnings from the same main employer that employed 
their father. Though there is also a clear gradient in the Danish context, the pattern is not as sharp 
as in Canada. 
Table 2 offers evidence that is more directly related to equality of opportunity by 
presenting the results from quantile regressions of the standard linear model, but in a way that 
permits the intergenerational earnings elasticity to change according to whether or not the son 
held a job with the same main firm as his father. The following fully interacted model is 






ln Yi,t = α + β lnYi,t-1 + β1 lnYi,t-1 × SameFirmi + γ1SameFirmi + εi 
where lnYi is a measure of the natural logarithm of permanent earnings for an individual in family 
i, t indexes generations, and SameFirm is a binary indicator taking the value of 1 when the main 
firm is the same across generations. Our interest is with the coefficient, β1, the interaction 
between paternal earnings and SameFirm, and how its value changes across the percentiles of the 
sons’ earning distribution. If statistically significant the implication would be that the 
intergenerational earnings elasticity is ( β  + β1 ) for those with the same main firm as their 
fathers. The first two columns of the table also offer results from a model with no interaction 
effects. 
  Our interpretation of these results borrows from Grawe (2004), who suggests that the use 
of quantile regressions offers an appropriate way to empirically implement the concerns raised by 
Roemer (2004). Roemer states that ―equality of opportunity … views inequalities of outcome as 
indefensible, ethically speaking, when and only when they are due to differential circumstances. 
Inequalities due to differential effort are acceptable.‖ (2004, page 50) Grawe echoes the view that 
a focus on average outcomes, as for example in the standard linear regression to the mean model, 14 
 
is not an appropriate indicator of equality of opportunity because abilities and preferences that 
have value in the market place will be correlated with the parents’ economic circumstances. His 
interpretation of Roemer is to suggest ―comparing children with similarly successful outcomes 
relative to other children born to similar families. That is, … [compare] the highest-, median-, or 
lowest-earning child born to low-earning parents to the highest-, median-, or lowest-earning child 
born to high-earning parents.‖ (Grawe, 2004 page 59) Quantile regression is one way of doing 
this. Equality of opportunity would be signaled by a low vale for β among all sons who are 
successful in the labour market, those who for example have earnings at the 90
th percentile. If a 
significant gradient between parent and child earnings exists for these high achieving sons, then 
the suggestion is that in spite of having the abilities and preferences for labour market success the 
sons of low-income parents remain hampered by the economic circumstances of their family 
background, a situation that cannot be characterized as equality of opportunity. 
  The results for Canada show that the intergenerational earnings elasticity between fathers 
and sons falls at successively higher quantiles from about 0.3 at the 10
th percentile to as low 0.16 
at the 90
th. But this is only so in the absence of same firm employment. The results for the 
interaction term show that the intergenerational transmission of employers is a force working in 
the opposite direction. There is a greater stickiness in father-son earning outcomes for those who 
inherit their father’s employer, with the increase in the slope being on the margins of statistical 
significance at the 10
th percentile (the marginal significance level of a t-test is 0.065), but then 
rising in magnitude so as to double the elasticity at the 75
th percentile and to more than double it 
at the 90
th. At the 90
th percentile the intergenerational earnings elasticity is 0.158, but 
significantly higher at 0.35 when the son is employed by the same main firm as the father. In this 
sense the results confirm the visual impression from Figure 4. The suggestion is that high-
achieving sons of low earning fathers must have a greater endowment of characteristics valued in 
the marketplace than their counterparts with high earning fathers: this endowment compensating 
them for not having access to the same parental resources associated with the intergenerational 15 
 
transmission of employers, and implying that their labour market outcomes would have been even 
better otherwise. 
  In Denmark, the overall pattern across the quantiles is the opposite, rising from lowest to 
highest. Paternal earnings are unrelated to the outcomes of the lowest achieving sons, but much 
more so for the highest achieving offspring: that is, higher earning fathers are not any more able 
to influence the outcomes of their sons with the least potential than low earning fathers, but they 
are more able to do so for sons with the greatest potential. This said, it should be noted that the 
magnitude of the elasticity at the higher quantiles is in the range of the Canadian findings. 
Further, the interaction term for same main employer is positive and statistically significant 
throughout the son’s earnings distribution. Though the magnitude falls above the 10
th percentile, 
at the 90
th percentile the overall intergenerational elasticity for those inheriting their father’s main 





Our result should be understood as descriptive, documenting the nature of the gradient in parent-
child outcomes at the later stages of the child’s life course and relating this to the structure of 
labour markets and how young adults make the transition from schooling to work. We find three 
very similar outcomes in Canada and Denmark, two countries that are characterized by relatively 
high levels of intergenerational earnings mobility. 
  First, the intergenerational transmission of employers is a common feature of the 
employment outcomes of the young cohorts of men we study, with 30 to 40% of young adults 
having at some point been employed with a firm that also employed their father. In large measure 
this is associated with the first jobs these individuals obtain during their teen years, but for four to 
about six percent it also refers to their main job in adulthood. We do not control for any family 16 
 
specific characteristics or investments made during earlier years, and therefore the root causes of 
these patterns are not clear. 
  This said, these rather high levels in the incidence of sons ever having worked with the 
same employer as their fathers may not be out of line with some of the basic facts of how young 
people find jobs. Families and friends are often cited as the most important source of information 
for new jobs. Granovetter (1995) was among the first to document this in a small scale survey for 
a particular labor market, and Holzer (1988) offers the theoretical underpinning by modeling the 
choice of search methods and suggesting that family and friends are a relatively productive and 
low cost way of obtaining job offers. More recently Datcher Loury (2006) shows that close to the 
majority of jobs in the United States are found through family, friends or acquaintances, while 
Grenon (1999) reports that for Canada about one-quarter of successful job searches involves 
family or friends. These patterns may differ in a more structured European labor market, but the 
findings in Kramarz and Skans (2007), whose methods are most closely related to our approach, 
suggest that they may be broadly applicable. These authors find that there is a high tendency for 
young adults in Sweden to find their first job in the very same plant that employs their parent. 
  The incidence of sons ever having worked with the same firm as their fathers in large 
measure reflects the job search process during the teen years. In both countries this incidence 
does increase sharply up to about the age of 20, and at least implies that the intergenerational 
inheritance of employers during these years may refer to temporary employment during the 
school to work transition. Even if this is the case it can be understood as a type of parental 
investment that may have longer term consequences as the sons inheriting a job may be more 
likely to gain work experience, job tenure and associated general and firm specific human capital. 
They may also avoid unemployment, and thereby can be imagined to gain a head start in 
establishing themselves in the longer market over the long term. 
  Our second major finding is that the intergenerational transmission of employers is 
positively associated with paternal earnings, rising distinctly and sharply at the very top of the 17 
 
earnings distribution. This is robust to a host of controls for the structure of the labor market and 
characteristics of the firms with which fathers are employed. This finding is new and builds upon 
Corak and Piraino (2011, 2010) by showing that the pattern is robust across two different labor 
markets. 
It may be that the network and other information fathers offer their sons lowers search 
costs in particular sectors, and that job offers are more likely to be obtained in some firms if the 
father is or has been employed with those firms. Caliendo et al. (2009) adapt Holzer’s model in 
this way to account for the influence of network effects. Though particular firms may have 
explicit policies concerning the preferential hiring of the children of employees, this falls short of 
nepotism in which parents are exerting direct control over the hiring process. Though we do find 
a strong positive relationship between parental self-employment and the intergenerational 
transmission of employers, the incidence of the former is not so great as to suggest that direct 
control over the hiring process is the main reason why 30 to 40% of sons at some point worked 
for the same firm as their fathers. Parental networks and information are a more likely story, and 
should be seen as another type of investment that parents make in the human capital of their 
children. But the consequences of this influence cannot be understood in isolation of the structure 
of labor markets. 
This said, there is a sense that nepotism may be part of the explanation for some 
segments of the population, particularly at the very top where we document distinct 
discontinuities in the relationship between paternal earnings and the chances of being employed 
with the father’s employer. This finds some corroboration in the literature on firm succession. In 
particular, Bennedsen et al. (2007) examine the succession decisions of limited liability firms, 
both public and private, in Denmark between 1994 and 2002. They focus specifically on the 
impact on firm performance of family successions, but they also document that over this period 
that one-third of successions were family based, in which the new CEO was related through blood 
or marriage to the departing CEO. Our data may be picking up some of this dynamic, or the more 18 
 
general idea that at the highest earning levels parents are more likely to have control over the 
hiring process and use this in a way that is of benefit for their children. Blanchflower and Oswald 
(2009), Dunn, and Holtz-Eakin (2000), and  Farlie and Robb (2007) describe the very high 
tendency of self-employed sons to have self-employed fathers and family members, and that this 
involves, at least with the American data used by Farlie and Robb (2007), the intergenerational 
transmission of firms in almost 50% of cases. 
Our third finding is that the intergenerational transmission of employers has implications 
for the intergenerational transmission of earnings. The degree and pattern of intergenerational 
earnings mobility is very similar in Canada and Denmark, with very similar tendencies for those 
born to low and high-income fathers to remain in low and high income as adults. But mobility out 
of the bottom has little to do with inheriting an employer for the father, while the preservation of 
high income status is distinctly related to this tendency. 
  While the interpretation of our findings is open to discussion, we follow the suggestions 
in some of the existing literature to relate the findings to empirical measures of equality of 
opportunity to suggest that the inheritance of employers cuts against this commonly held value. 
These findings also raise the importance of recognizing that child outcomes are related to the 
structure of labor markets, and therefore that the resources parents bring—though information, 
networks, or direct control of the hiring process—will influence the final transition children make 
in becoming self-sufficient and successful adults. 
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The descriptions of the two sets of administrative data that follow pertain to the complete 
underlying data. It is on the basis of these data that analytical files appropriate for a comparative 
analysis will be derived involving similar cohorts of individuals and the analysis of similar points 
in their life cycles.  
 
Danish Data – the IDA 
 
1.  Sampling frame and representativeness 
 
The data is known as the IDA and is based on Danish administrative registers. It follows the 
entire Danish population from the year 1980, and is available on an annual basis up to 2007. 
 
The register starts in 1980 with detailed information. The link between parents and children is 
established in 1970 at the last census held in 1970. The link is established for all children living 
with their parents at that time. As most children in Denmark live with their parents to the age of 
14 at least, this means that the register covers the link for all those born after 1956 and will cover 
a substantial part of those born before because at that time leaving the parental home happened at 
a later stage of life. In 1980, the 1956 cohort was 24 years old. We can then follow this generation 
until 2007 where they will be 51 years old or younger. The parents can of course be followed 
from the time where the children had become 24. 
 
The basis of this research proposal will more likely be parents and children at the time the 
children turn 14. These children can be followed from 1980, meaning that we can include the 
cohorts born after 1966. They are expected to have 14 year old children themselves when they 
turn 40-41 in 2007. Similarly, a link can be established to siblings.  Furthermore, a number of 
these 2
nd generation children born in 1980 or before would be 27 or more in the last year of the 
register in 2007. Thus, we are close to having 3 generations. 
 
There will be attrition in the panel due only to natural causes (emigration and death). 
 
2.  Detailed variable description 
 
Parental Resources (P) include income and wage income of both parents, available on an annual 
basis. Furthermore, we know the education of the parents and siblings and when the education 
was received as well as home ownership. Job situation, regional address and similar information 
are also available. 
 
All variables are measured on an annual basis. The information is highly reliable since it 
originates in registers. But most importantly for present purposes we also know the identity of the 
workplace or firm, where the father or mother was working in any year after 1980. 
 
The information on C2, C3 and P can be measured at the time the child is born to 16 years of age. 
The cost of choosing a young age is fewer observations for the outcome variable. 
 
With respect to outcomes, we know the income, education and house ownership of the offspring 
in any particular year or age. We also know where the children were employed for the first job or 
apprentice training, as well as all subsequent jobs. Firms and workplaces regularly change 
identity over time, but due to a specific data development work we are in a position to construct a 22 
 
longitudinally consistent firm identifier. Thus, we can identify if the offspring has been employed 
at the same work place as either the father or mother. 
 
3. Control variables 
 
In addition to full information on the nature of parental income and basic demographic 
information, the data offer the capacity to control for region, age and siblings, year, marital status, 
local conditions depending on municipality (schools). Furthermore, we have information on the 
foreign born. The latter is measured for all immigrants, simply because they are given their social 





Canadian Data – the IID 
 
1.  Sampling frame and representativeness 
 
The data is known as the IID (the Intergenerational Income Data) and is based on administrative 
data associated with Canadian income tax information returns linked into families over time. It is 
housed at Statistics Canada. 
 
Canadians file their income tax returns (so-called T1 Forms) on an individual basis, and Statistics 
Canada has grouped these into families using a variety of matching strategies. This involves the 
use of administration data on a universal program of child allowances in place during the 1970s 
and 1980s, address information, and names. The resulting T1 Family File (T1FF) is the basic 
building block for the creation of the IID, an intergenerational linked set of T1 Forms for a series 
of cohorts of young men and women, and their mothers and fathers. 
 
This represents not quite four million individuals and their parents, involving a number of age 
cohorts. We focus on the cohort born between 1963 and 1966, and in fact for the most part the 
oldest subset born in 1963. These individuals are linked to their fathers—not necessarily their 
biological fathers—if they filed an income tax return between 1982 and 1986 while still living at 
home. This is required to ensure that a parent-child match is made, and also that the child has an 
observed Social Insurance Number (SIN), a unique individual identifier that can then be used to 
link all subsequent T1 Forms which contain information on earnings. 
 
These T1 Forms are available for all years between 1978 and 1996. The algorithm used to create 
the data leads to an under-representation of children from lower income backgrounds, and from 
the major metropolitan areas: Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver. This reflects the fact that 
children who leave home early or who otherwise are not engaged in the labour market while at 
home are less likely to be linked to a parent. It also reflects the fact that new immigrants and their 
children will be under-represented in the data, the majority having a tendency to settle in the three 
major cities of the country. The nature of this under-reporting has been explored in a number of 
research documents. In a series of published research papers it is not found to play a role in 
biasing analytical results. 
 
The IID is supplemented with a series of weights derived from the Census of the population in 




2.  Detailed variable description 
 
Parental Resources includes income and earnings of both parents, available on an annual basis. 
Furthermore, there is detailed information on the source of income, including self-employment 
income and income from other sources, including government transfers. There is no information 
on the education of parents, and children, and sibling information is available only for those 
siblings present in the household at the time the family linkage was made. Other basic 
demographic information such as gender, address of residence, and marital status is also 
available. 
 
All variables are measured on an annual basis. The information is highly reliable since it 
originates in registers. The identity of the enterprise, where the father, mother, and children work 
is determined through a linkage to a longitudinally consistent dataset of all firms in Canada from 
1978 to 1996, also produced by Statistics Canada. This dataset corrects for any changes in firm 
status through time, including mergers and bankruptcies. The firm identifiers are available for up 
to four firms per year in each year. These firms represent the top four firms accounting for annual 
earnings in that year. Up to 97% of all earnings are accounted for by these employers. 
 
The information on C and P can be measured at the time the child is from 15 onward. 
 
Child outcomes include income, earnings, government transfers and region of residence in any 
particular year or age, as well as the employer (this also includes the three digit industry of the 
employer) for all employers (again up to four per year) the child has had since the age of 15 to 
about the age of 30. For the oldest cohort this involves using information from 1978 to 1996. As 
such we can identify if the child has been employed at the same work place as either the father or 
mother and at what point in the life cycle this has occurred. 
 
The firm data is based upon an accurate representation of the private sector but our analysis of the 
intergenerational transfer of employers is hampered by the fact that it does not distinguish 
separate employers in the public sector (the federal and provincial governments, but not the 
municipal governments). For anything finer than a two-digit industry analysis this will overstate 
the degree to which employers or industries are passed across the generations. 
 
 
3. Control variables 
 
In addition to full information on the nature of parental income and basic demographic 
information, the data offer the capacity to control for detailed region of residence, age and 
siblings (though as mentioned this is not complete), year, marital status, local labour market 
conditions and community characteristics, firm size and industry. Furthermore, there is no 





Appendix Table 1 
Quartile earnings transition matrix with proportions of intergenerational transmission of 




A. Father-son earnings quartile transition matrix  
 
    Sons 
 
 
Fathers  Bottom  2
nd  3
rd  Top 
         
Bottom  0.351 (0.304)  0.282 (0.302)  0.207 (0.233)  0.161 (0.161) 
2
nd  0.267 (0.254)  0.277 (0.288)  0.254 (0.258)  0.202 (0.200) 
3
rd  0.215 (0.231)  0.238 (0.240)  0.277 (0.269)  0.271 (0.259) 
Top  0.168 (0.210)  0.203 (0.170)  0.262 (0.240)  0.367 (0.380) 
         
         
         




   
Sons 
 
Fathers  Bottom  2
nd  3
rd  Top 
         
Bottom  0.041 (0.033)  0.048 (0.042)  0.038 (0.032)  0.042 (0.023) 
2
nd  0.027 (0.024)  0.059 (0.050)  0.067 (0.049)  0.061 (0.028) 
3
rd  0.022 (0.020)  0.046 (0.042)  0.083 (0.054)  0.101 (0.036) 
Top  0.029 (0.024)  0.044 (0.043)  0.079 (0.059)  0.116 (0.067) 
         
         




Table 1     
Selected results from linear probability models of the correlates of sons having the same 
employer as their fathers: Canada and Denmark 
 
     
     
  Canada  Denmark 
     
     
1. Sons ever having same employer as father     
ln of father’s permanent earnings  -0.486  -0.718 
ln of father’s permanent earnings squared  0.0431  0.070 
Indicator father having self-employment income  0.0476  0.338 
     
2. Sons having same main employer as father     
ln of father’s permanent earnings  -0.242   -0.359 
ln of father’s permanent earnings squared  0.0175   0.0220 
Indicator father having self-employment income  0.0054   0.0370 
     
 
Source: Calculations by authors using least squares regression using Danish administrative data, Corak and Piraino (2011, tables 4 and 
5) for Canadian results based upon Canadian administrative data. 
 
Panel 1 reports results from a linear probability model with the dependent variable being a 0-1 indicator of whether the son at any 
point between the ages of 15 and 30 worked for an employer for which his father had previously worked. The overall incidence of this 
occurring is presented as the last data point in Figure 1, approximately 0.40 in Canada and 0.28 in Denmark. 
 
Panel 2 reports results from a similar model, but with the dependent variable being a 0-1 indicator of whether the son’s main employer 
in adulthood, the employer accounting for the majority of earnings, was the same main employer of the father when the son was a 
teenager. The overall incidence of this occurring is 0.056 in Canada and 0.041 in Denmark. 
 
All results are statistically significant at the 95% level of confidence. 
 
Other controls in both models include: indicators for presence of farming, fishing, and professional income; indicators for firm death 
and firm size; industry employment growth rate; average years of schooling in 2-digit industry; urban indicator, province/region 





Table 2         
Quantile regression estimates of the intergenerational earnings elasticity and the impact of same 
main firm employment 
 
   
No Interactions 
 
Fully Interacted model 
               














             
1. Canada             
10
th percentile  0.328  5.86  0.309  0.128  -0.938  5.99 
25
th percentile  0.308  6.71  0.291  0.158  -1.43  6.83 
50
th percentile  0.253  7.48  0.238  0.177  -1.74  7.61 
75
th percentile  0.205  8.45  0.190  0.196  -2.01  8.59 
90
th percentile  0.170  9.05  0.158  0.190  -1.98  9.15 
             
2. Denmark             
10
th percentile  0.051  8.93  0.036  0.180  -1.84  9.29 
25
th percentile  0.132  9.65  0.123  0.135  -1.58  9.77 
50
th percentile  0.178  9.47  0.169  0.133  -1.62  9.56 
75
th percentile  0.195  9.49  0.188  0.138  -1.72  9.56 
90
th percentile  0.197  9.70  0.191  0.132  -1.67  9.77 
 
             
For the fully ineracted model the reported coefficients are quantile regression estimates of the following model:  
ln Yi,t = α + β lnYi,t-1 + β1 lnYi,t-1 × SameFirmi + γ1SameFirmi 
where t indexes the son’s permanent earnings and t-1 the fathers. SameFirm is a binary indicator of whether the son was employed by 
the same employer as the father. The model also includes controls for the father’s age and age squared. 
 
The no interactions model only has lnYi,t-1  as a regressor. 
 
All coefficients have margin significance levels of 0.000, except those lightly shaded, which have a marginal significance level greater 
than 0.05. 
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Source: Calculations by authors using administrative data, Corak and Piraino (2011, figure 1). 28 
 
 
Figure 2  
Proportion of sons currently employed or employed at some point with an employer their 














































  Father’s earning percentile when the son was 15 to 19 years of age 
 
 





Proportion of sons employed as young adults with the same main employer as their fathers: 

















































  Father’s earning percentile when the son was 15 to 19 years of age 
 
 





The association between earnings mobility and the transmission of employers for sons raised in 
the bottom and top earnings quartiles: Canada and Denmark 
 
 
A. Earnings mobility for sons of bottom and top earning fathers 
     












































































































Bottom Second Third Top
 
  Sons’ earnings quartile in adulthood 
     
Source: Calculations by authors using administrative data. 
 
Gray bars indicate Canada, dark bars indicate Denmark. 
 